ABSTRACT
Utilitarianism is a familiar position among philosophers in the British Isles and has lately been presented in perhaps its most extreme form by J. J. C. Smart. 1 Smart argues vigorously against those he regards as holding an inferior and illogical view of utilitarianism, namely, the restricted utilitarians. The advocates of restricted utilitarianism, Smart says, hold that certain rules of thumb, which are good rules for a great majority of cases, ought to be followed generally, even in those cases in which they do not produce the best result. This, Smart contends, is an untenable position. I should like to show, to the contrary, that no rational man can in practice exclusively follow the extreme utilitarian doctrine, that is, choose the most advantageous action in a set of circumstances regardless of rules to the contrary, any more than any society could tolerate the doctrine as the exclusive basis for social action. The arguments I employ may raise some questions about utilitarianism in any form, but I do not wish at this time to push the argument that far.
