ABSTRACT

239For almost half a century historians and social scientists have attempted to provide a comprehensive and compelling account of Mussolini’s Fascism. The collective effort has produced a number of notable historical works, particularly those of Renzo De Felice—but all historical works, good and bad alike, inevitably exploit social science generalizations upon which, in the final analysis, “understanding” must rest. Moreover, such generalizations provide sorting criteria for the selective reporting of information in historical narratives. De Felice, for instance, feels not only that it is significant to report that “business interests” provided some financial support for Mussolini’s efforts to bring Italy into World War I, but he also provides an account of the motives which animated that support. 1 Interred in such a recital are a number of low-level and commonsense generalizations: men act as a consequence of motives, some motives are financial in character, businessmen can be understood to be moved by profit concerns, intervention in World War I necessarily implied increased armaments production and the possibility of increased profits, therefore some businessmen were disposed to aid Mussolini’s efforts. Laced together by some commonsense logic, the account furnishes a measure of “understanding” on why there was business support for Mussolini’s publication that advertised itself as a “socialist daily.” A more adequate understanding of such a sequence would require a review of the empirical regularities governing decision making under conditions of cross-pressure—in which political actors are moved by conflicting impulses, attitudes, interests and/or cognitive appraisals. Intervention in World War I, it might be argued, may have had a higher immediate salience among the multiple 240interests that animate businessmen than opposition to “socialism”—an argument that would rest on further empirical generalizations.