ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the authors look for sophisticated voting in the context of a one-dimensional model. They argue that truly sincere voting should almost always be observed, largely because the framers of bills should be able to anticipate how to draft their legislation to command a majority. Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors' search of the literature on strategic voting found very few bothersome needles in their haystack of the 37,000 roll calls in the first 100 Congresses. The presence of a mixture of voting types suggests that the basic one-dimensional voting model with a single midpoint might be improved upon by a two-point model where extremists on both ends vote one way and moderates vote the other. This so called both-ends-against-the-middle voting might also arise because extremists are position-taking or expressing alienation. When there is a mixture of sincere and sophisticated types, agenda manipulation is possible.
