ABSTRACT
T H E Compromise placed Hungary in a position which in many ways was more favourable than she had enjoyed since Mohacs; in some respects, the nation had never before in its history been so truly master of its own destinies. From Pozsony to the Iron Gates, from the Tatras to Nagykanizsa, a single law reigned, administered by one government, which was able to express its w i l l , and that of the parliament to which i t was answerable, in a far wider field and with far fewer limitations than ever before. In all internal affairs - and that term included the Hungaro-Croat relationship and the nationalities question - the Crown retained only those limited powers of intervention which the central European political philosophy of the day commonly allowed to a constitutional monarch. These included the right to appoint the Minister President and to dissolve or prorogue parliament, but not to rule indefinitely without a parliament, nor to veto legislation enacted by i t ; although this last omission was largely rendered superfluous by his power to choose the Minister President of his w i l l and by a right conceded to him by convention to give or refuse 'preliminary sanction' to a Bill before i t was introduced.
