ABSTRACT
Prior to the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993, which ended Rwanda’s three year civil war, Rwandan Hutu extremists had already begun preparations for a genocidal insurgency against the soon-to-be implemented, broad-based transitional government. Rwanda’s social structure and history are intertwined, and one must understand the two to comprehend the Hutu extremist genocidal insurgency. From the outset of the insurgency, the local population in western Rwandan tended to support the insurgents, many of whom still had family inside Rwanda. By the summer of 1996, the Hutu extremist genocidal insurgency seemed to be gaining steam, with no end in sight for the refugee problem in eastern Zaire, despite a few feeble attempts by the Mobutu regime to send refugees back to Rwanda. All competitors in an insurgency, including interveners, have two tools at their disposal: enhancement of perceived legitimacy and the credible capacity to coerce. The government apparently is winning its fight against the Hutu extremist genocidal insurgency.
