ABSTRACT
The legal norm, therefore, is merely one of the rules of conduct, of th e sam e nature a s al l other rule s o f conduct . Fo r reason s readily understood , th e prevailin g schoo l of juristic scienc e does not stress this fact, but, for practical reasons, emphasizes the antithesis between la w and th e othe r norms , especially the ethical norms, in order to urge upon th e judge at ever y turn a s impressively as possible that he must render hi s decisions solely according t o law and neve r accordin g to other rules . Wher e the stat e has no t obtaine d a complet e monopol y of lawmaking , this an - tithesis is no t emphasized ver y much. I n Rome , where the la w has bee n define d a s th e ars aequi et boni, i t wa s hardl y eve r heard of ; and amon g the present-da y English , it is not stressed
nearly so forcibly. I n those fields of law in which juristic scienc e does no t subserv e th e practica l purpose s o f judicia l decision , in internationa l law , in Staatsrecht (public la w in th e narro w sense), i n administrativ e law, law i s b y n o mean s s o carefull y distinguished fro m morals , ethica l custom , decorum , an d tact , from th e so-calle d Konventionalregeln (conventiona l rules), an d even fro m consideration s o f expediency, a s i s the case , in theory at least , i n private and penal law.
