ABSTRACT
Any government has established an Office of Denuclearization Design, or a Project on Denuclearization Design, but the governments of Britain, China, and the United States conduct nuclear weapon policy studies in state research centers. The United Kingdom has developed particular expertise in the monitoring of fissile materials and nuclear tests. Any verification regime will have to be robust, effective and mutually trusted and, crucially, one that doesn't give away national security or proliferation-sensitive information. Research into how one technically verifies the dismantlement of a warhead continues at the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston. In a world of projects on denuclearization design, others would track, critique, and extend this work, and address whether there are means to identify war-heads which do not require that design information be made public. The problem set—technical issues in verification of reductions—may well yield results confirming the views of both denuclearizers and stand-fast nuclearists.
