ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses political measures by which the prospects for zero nuclear weapons (ZNW) could be advanced: active reassurance, dispute resolution procedures, "conventional" force limits, and the means and political processes of an effective collective security regime. The Moscow Treaty contributes to ZNW only because it implies negotiation on the numbers of deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and on verification. Some treaties contain partial and preliminary measures to regulate nuclear weapons. Partial measures would be superseded by a completed abolition regime, but could serve in the interim. If abolition were achieved, export controls might be retained as verification measures or impediments to violation, governing—for example—centrifuges suited to uranium enrichment. An agreement defines the weapon itself, delivery systems, locations, or use, and may be prohibitive, permissive, or permissive to a numeric ceiling. One approach would be to identify the most central prerequisites for transition to ZNW and its maintenance.
