ABSTRACT
The country that has already built nuclear weapons could—after ZNW had been instituted—elect to reconstitute a nuclear capability. In a nuclear state, some advocates of ZNW may be tempted to argue that if ZNW turns sour reconstitution could be pursued. The world of Zero Nuclear Weapons would have vanished once a first reconstitution had created a nuclear weapon. Among the prime "Wanted" items for any body charged to administer a ZNW regime, key components of old nuclear weapon programs would be of special interest. If this new capability were neither announced nor used, it would have no political utility. A ZNW regime's enforcement provisions would meet their sternest test in responding to reconstitution measures by a onetime nuclear weapon state, especially if that state had capable military and diverse resources at its command. It is evidently easier for a state with a civil nuclear fuel industry, or stocks of fissile material, to constitute or reconstitute a weapons production.
