ABSTRACT
President Nasser has ensured himself the advantage of the first move. France, which has ceased to be Israel's ally since the end of the Algerian war, has resolved energetically not to take sides, while concealing her inability to act by putting forward a plan for 'concerted action' by the four 'Great Powers'. The United States and, subsidiarily, Great Britain seem to have hovered between two policies. Naturally, both the Americans and the British remembered their commitment in respect of Israel and the principle of freedom of movement in the Gulf of Aqaba. In such circumstances words mean nothing or, to be more precise, they can take on two radically opposed meanings. They herald either the decision to resort to force or else the provisional acceptance of the fait accompli, with the vague promise of extracting by negotiation what one has forborne to conquer by arms. The American mixture of firm speaking and passivity shed the major responsibility on to Israel.
