ABSTRACT
The embassy in Havana outlined with considerably cogency the methodological impossibility of isolating US equipment and personnel trained to use it from the main fighting forces of the Cuban army, which were by now engaged in fighting Fidel Castro's rebels. US patience and restraint discouraged and demoralized the growing domestic opposition on the island, upon which Washington was eventually counting to improve the situation on the ground. Cuba's prearranged position in the US domestic sugar market meant that it was not possible to abolish its quota overnight without causing serious shortages and disruptions at home. General Fulgencio Batista had come to power in Cuba through a coup d'etat in March 1952, so that at the time the volume opens, he was about to complete his six-year presidential term. By early 1958, Batista had exhausted his political credit with the Cuban public, including important sectors of the business community.
