ABSTRACT
For more than three-and-a-half decades Malaysia operated one of the most stable political regimes in East Asia. Skillfully purveying an adjustable mix of authoritarian controls and democratic procedures, its government perpetuated a sturdy hybridity that some analysts have labelled as electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006). Under this regime type, the government reliably refreshed its extraordinary two-thirds parliamentary majority, necessary for unilaterally amending the constitution, through eight consecutive general elections. But in Malaysia’s contest held in 2008, the incumbent government was dealt such a startling setback that while it clung to office, it lost its extraordinary majority in parliament and control over four of the country’s 13 states while failing to regain a fifth. There had been no economic crisis or elite-level ructions beforehand. Accordingly, the regime’s institutions and the ruling party’s apparatus had remained unchanged in their form and general functioning. And they had been defended by the government with its customary rhetoric and campaign appeals, stressing its respect for participation and choice, but underscoring the need also amid late-industrialization and societal pluralism for curbs on competitiveness. But while these institutions and the rhetoric that legitimated them had long reproduced electoral victories, their attractiveness appeared now to be fading. Though they had earlier helped the government in justifying its continuity in power, they were reinterpreted now by many citizens as masking party corruption and ethnic exclusion. Further, this erosion was in many ways deepened by the most recent election held in May 2013, with the government this time winning less than half of the popular vote. Thus, in the context of what are best understood as ‘liberalizing electoral outcomes’ (Howard and Roessler 2006), there are reasons for thinking that Malaysia’s regime has shifted in character from an electoral to ‘competitive’ authoritarian regime, one in which despite the persistence of many controls, government turnover is more imaginable. Indeed, as the 2013 election approached, speculation mounted that the opposition could win outright, a trajectory that might finally have amounted, so long as the new government that formed stayed true to its reformist pledges, to a process of ‘democratization-by-election’ (Lindberg 2009). In these circumstances, the government seemed unsure over when to
dissolve parliament, its hesitation contrasting sharply with the confidence with which it had instantly called snap elections in the past. Malaysia’s record thus permits us to address a number of questions about democracy’s meaning in an authoritarian context and the dynamics of democratic change. What are the key dimensions of electoral authoritarianism? How has this regime type been reinforced in Malaysia by a single dominant party? What historical and structural grounding has this regime and dominant party possessed? How specifically have electoral procedures and parliamentary activities enhanced this regime type’s resilience? Why has the tide seemed recently to change, with the same sets of mechanisms that had long placated social constituencies now so alienating many citizens that they join in mass protests against the government and cast their votes for the opposition? And finally, how effectively has the government responded with new strategies by which to ward off democratic change? It bears underscoring that these pressures have been accumulating in noncrisis conditions. Malaysia has confronted no economic shock, violent sectarian upheavals, serious secessionist pressures, or intense international conflict. Further, ruling elites have displayed no sudden surge in fractiousness. The country’s record thus offers a rare vantage point from which to examine the intrinsic tensions which, in cumulating over time, can poise even the hardiest of electoral authoritarian regimes for fuller democratization – galvanized, perhaps, by the very elections that had once given this regime its resilience.
