ABSTRACT
A central aim of philosophy is to “see something as it is.” If this is achieved, we have a reasonable benchmark for approaching another “thing as it is.” This simple remark of Wittgenstein’s embraces a most fundamental question within philosophy. “A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar,” he once said (PI II, xi, p. 222). The effort to see another’s world “as it is,” a particular aspect of African culture for example, when one is alien to that culture, poses several difficulties. His remark, however, deflects us from thinking that philosophy is just a matter of one’s own perspective, opinion, or point of view. The philosopher cannot say “every view has its charm.” It is not that there are not different points of view. Rather the views we have are significant and meaningful in the manner we come to engage and express what is-the very being of the world and our being in it. If I come to a significant, that is, considered view of the world I inhabit, then I have a starting point for venturing to understand another’s world. In this way there is the possibility of moving toward mutual understanding.
