ABSTRACT
As with so many other subjects in strategic studies, discussion of strategy at or from the sea is somewhat clouded by problems of definition. The three main definition contenders for this form of strategic power are ‘maritime’, ‘naval’ and ‘sea’. The subject is further complicated by the fact that individually these terms may mean substantially different things to different people. Essentially, the problem of definition comes down to scope. What capabilities, resources and activities should be included in an analysis of strategy at or from the sea? The terms naval and maritime are perhaps the easiest to distinguish. It is generally accepted that the former refers to military capabilities. This includes platforms such as ships, aircraft and submarines, as well as the infrastructure on which they rely. The personnel who man these platforms also represent a crucial element of naval power. In contrast, maritime is a far more encompassing term, including as it does ‘the full range of mankind’s relationship to the seas and oceans’.1 In addition to military assets, maritime includes such activities as merchant shipping and insurance. It also covers assets from the other geographical environments that may influence actions at sea, such as land-based air power. The difficulties of definition really begin when one considers sea power. For Geoffrey Till, sea power is synonymous with the broad definition of maritime power.2 In contrast, Eric Grove prefers to limit his discussion of sea power to military matters.3 This chapter will adopt the latter, more restrictive approach, and thereby use the term sea power to discuss the use of military power at or from the sea for the attainment of policy objectives.
