ABSTRACT
Since their first use in 1945 nuclear weapons have arguably posed the greatest challenge to modern strategic theorists and practitioners. Put simply, the scale of the challenge emanates from the enormous destructive power of these weapons. When nuclear warheads were placed atop ballistic missiles with flight times measured in minutes, the challenge was magnified. In an age of thermonuclear ballistic missiles, global devastation was potentially only minutes away. The challenge for strategists was how to harness such awesome power for strategic effect. This was made even more problematic by the security environment of the Cold War, in which suspicion and fear of surprise attack were prevalent. In response to these challenges, the intellectual endeavour devoted to nuclear strategy gave rise to the modern academic subject of strategic studies. It may not be too far-fetched to say that this very book (written by two civilian academic authors) would not have been written were it not for the invention of nuclear weapons.1 This chapter will begin by outlining the basic characteristics of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The essence of nuclear strategy cannot be understood without some sense of the weapons themselves. This is one occasion in strategy where the technology of the weapons systems has a direct impact on the formation of strategy. Having provided this technological backdrop, the chapter will then analyse the rich history of Cold War nuclear strategy. This so-called ‘golden age’ of strategic thought witnessed the development of most of the core concepts in nuclear strategy. Indeed, strategy in general benefited from the intellectual endeavours of the period. To cite one example, Thomas Schelling’s work on the strategy of conflict has relevance well beyond the Cold War nuclear context.2 The focus of the chapter is predominately on the United States, mainly for methodological reasons. In particular, it is because the United States produced the most developed and open forms of nuclear strategy. However, reference is also made to Soviet, British and French nuclear strategy. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of current strategic thought on nuclear weapons. It will be argued that, aside from a few notable exceptions, nuclear
strategy has become the poor second cousin since the end of the Cold War. That being the case, the chapter will conclude with a modest attempt to formulate a theory of nuclear strategy for the modern age.
