Food, farming and rural society

Mention ‘food’ and historians of the British war effort between 1914 and 1918 will voice their agreement as to its critical role in her struggle against the Central Powers. In his memoirs, Lloyd George emphasized food supplies as the one decisive factor between victory and capitulation. ¹ It had been Germany’s failure to maintain adequate food stocks that had undermined her people’s will to fight and accelerated the country’s defeat. In Britain, the food issue boiled down to a question of feeding the vastly expanded armed services whilst maintaining supplies for her workers and families. This was a challenge of some magnitude. British farming was, by comparison with that of her enemies, relatively small and under-prepared to meet national needs. Before the war much of Britain’s food was imported. It was said that four out of every five slices of bread eaten by Britons was made from foreign flour; and, despite her naval dominance, the shipment of essential supplies of ‘staple’ foods, principally from the Americas and Australasia, was vulnerable to attacks from German submarines. ² Thus, once again, dangerous circumstances compelled the government to act. British agriculture had to be mobilized to expand domestic sources of basic foodstuffs, home demand had to be controlled and shipping lanes had to be safeguarded. The outcome was broadly successful. The country did not starve, although distribution and galloping price inflation were major problems. But at least Britons were kept working and fighting, while the effects of growing state intervention in the countryside blew the wind of reform (for a short while) on to Britain’s fiercely independent farming industry and the rural communities on which it depended. It seemed a small price to pay for national survival.