ABSTRACT
T he term reactive attitudes was introduced by P. F. Strawson (1974) in his paper “Freedom and Resentment,” rightly viewed as one of the most impor-tant and revolutionary contributions to the free will debate in contemporary
philosophical discourse. Reactive attitudes, in Strawson’s terminology, are special emotion-laden responses to which human beings are naturally prone in their interactions with one another. They encompass emotions such as (this is Strawson’s list): gratitude and resentment, hurt feelings, indignation and approbation, shame and guilt, remorse and forgiveness, certain kinds of pride, and certain kinds of love. What makes reactive attitudes special is that they express both a sensitivity to how people are regarded and treated by one another in the context of their interactions and a normative demand that such treatment and regard reflect a basic stance of good will, modulated to suit the kinds of interactions in question (e.g., between family members, friends, relative strangers). As Strawson says, we care enormously whether people manifest good will, affection, or esteem in their interactions with others or if they express contempt, indifference, or malevolence. And we care whether we are the recipients of such treatment or whether others are (e.g., we might feel indignation when someone else is treated badly). We even care when others are the recipients and we are the perpetrators, actual or prospective (i.e., we are prone to feel shame and guilt).
