Towards a Phenomenological Moral Realism
The moral realism I have undertaken to elaborate, although up to now exclusively framed in concepts indebted to Aristotle’s and Kant’s ethics, is of a phenomenological inspiration. The close affi nity with the phenomenological tradition may have already been traced in the topics I have focused on. It will progressively become more manifest in two ways: On the one hand, in the present chapter I will appeal to patterns established by the phenomenological studies on perception; on the other, the three following chapters will consolidate my claims by bringing to light the reasons why Heidegger, Gadamer and Arendt, whilst they equally exploited Aristotle’s and Kant’s ethics, failed to develop a compelling phenomenological description of moral experience. Let me note from the outset that I will henceforth use the terms ‘phronetic perception’ and ‘prakton’ in a broader sense, that is to say, as descendents of (and not as identical with) the Aristotelian concepts.