ABSTRACT
Despite nearly 25 years of research, deceptive communication remains a scholarly domain devoid of viable theory. Of the four theories and conceptual frameworks advanced thus far (i.e., Bradac, Friedman, & Giles, 1986; Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Hocking & Leathers, 1980; McCornack, 1992), only Information Manipulation Theory (McCornack, 1992; see also McCornack, Levine, Solow-czuk, Torres, & Campbell, 1992; Lapinski, 1995; Sahlman & Canary, 1995), and Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; see also Buller & Burgoon, 1991; Buller, Burgoon, White, & Ebesu, 1994; Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, Afifi, & Feldman, 1996) have spawned programmatic lines of research related to deceptive message production. Both theories, however, are decidedly deficient, albeit in different ways. Information Manipulation Theory (IMT; McCornack, 1992) proposes that deceptive messages derive from speakers “transforming” relevant information (p. 6), but it fails to explicate this purported transformation process. IMT also confounds three distinct, significant issues within the same discussion: deceptive message production, deceptive message characteristics, and recipient interpretation of such messages (for a detailed critique of IMT, see Jacobs, Dawson, & Brashers, 1996). More importantly, IMT is not actually a theory at all: It provides no testable propositions or falsifiable hypotheses, hence, fails to meet the established criteria for viable social scientific theory (i.e., Popper, 1959).
