ABSTRACT
The argument for the view of biological function I have presented began with a principle stating the relevance of causal history to the teleological structures of functional systems. The principle was:
P: With regard to a given type of functional system S, whatever it is that is ultimately causally responsible for the compresence and organization of its parts and features—in such a way as to make it the case that it is no accident that the system possesses such parts and features and such an organization among them that they interactively bring about a certain special subset of the effects they do, thus allowing us to distinguish non-incidental effects or contributions from incidental ones—is thereby also responsible for determining the specification of working for S; that is, it equally determines the nature of the functions and ends served by these parts, features and activities so organized, and the way in which these functions and ends are related at various levels, i.e. how exactly they fit into the hierarchical teleological structure of S.
