ABSTRACT
I have relied heavily on Dawkins’ work in theoretical biology in arguing for a genetically-oriented account of biological teleology. It is therefore useful to point out the crucial differences between his conclusions and mine. To begin with, it should be noted that Dawkins is primarily concerned not with developing an account of biological function, but with arguing for a certain general and unified understanding of natural selection—a gene-centered view, as opposed to a species-, group- or even individual-centered view—and hence for a certain understanding of organisms as products of natural selection. This is part of the reason why it is risky, as already mentioned, to attribute to him any such claim as that genes cannot be said to have functions in organisms, on the basis of his general remarks about genes and organisms from an evolutionary point of view. Still, he does think that his general argument has relevance for understanding the proper use of teleological language in biology, and in fact he often states his conclusions in explicitly teleological terms. This is true both with regard to his most general thesis about the nature of adaptations, and with regard to more particular conclusions about particular adaptations.
