ABSTRACT
Terrorism and insurgency To differentiate between terrorism and insurgency, two terms often misused interchangeably, is not to merely engage in a facile semantic debate. The variances are on a qualitative, teleological and analytical level. Such discrepancies must be addressed if Al Qaeda is to be adequately conceptualised in its global context. Although definitions of such phenomena are subject to perennial contestation, a broad consensus has emerged. In essence, terrorism is a primarily symbolic tool of political violence applied tactically and often indiscriminately to ensure coercion through fear. An insurgency is a strategic effort to subvert, overthrow and then recast an existing status quo via a combination of political and violent means. 3 Therefore, not only must we distinguish terrorist from insurgent groups by their varying emphasis on tactical targeting, notably the level of discrimination in their attacks (insurgent groups have a far greater propensity for the bombing of specific targets, such as embassies or symbols of 'occupier' power, and for attacking mainly military and political targets as opposed to civilians) but we must also consider the difference of strategic endgames held by terrorist and insurgent groups. Although variations of both groups may hold similar ideological beliefs, the crucial discrepancy is that insurgent groups' overarching aim is to seize control of the state apparatus, as contrasted to purely symbolic terrorist acts that are designed primarily to disrupt or force a change in policy by existing elites. The contrasts between terrorism and insurgency have been muddied in recent years with the rise of the debate surrounding 'new terrorism'. Proponents of the notion of 'new terrorism' pointed to an emergent tendency during the 1990s for terrorist groups to undertake attacks of catastrophic violence, driven by unshakeable ideological or religious fanaticism to achieve fundamental overhauls in regional or even global governance.4 Yet arguably such analysis unwittingly describes characteristics of insurgent groups, particularly given the nature of their strategic objectives. Leaving aside the 'new' terrorism debate given the implicit presence of insurgent-related factors in the description of 'new' terrorism,s the differentiation between terrorism and insurgency therefore, can be epitomised by the variances in the character, scale and, most importantly, the purpose of the violence used.6 1t
Conceiving of Al Qaeda as an insurgent group is only one step to appreciating the fundamentals underlying the 'War on Terror'. Indeed, Western notions of in surgency itself have been moulded by the so-called 'classic' Maoist rural uprisings of the Cold War era whereby insurgents, largely communist, bound themselves within the parameters of a particular state or region. Such outmoded paradigms, however, do not render the classification of insurgency null and void. Al Qaeda and their affiliates share with by-gone insurgents the desire to overthrow an established ruling political and social order, but what transcends previous insurgencies is the sheer scope and span of the Islamistjihad. By seeking to depose the 'near enemy' (the perceived 'apostate' Muslim re gimes) and strike out at the 'far enemy' (the West), the globaljihad takes on the hallmarks of an international insurgency. The insurgent in the post-Maoist era of guerrilla warfare is defined by a new set of tactical and operational traits. As Thomas Hammes has noted, such emergent patterns include: the establishment of networked coalitions of insurgents; the escalation of the insurgent cause onto the international stage; the ability to self fund; and the representation of a variety of motivating factors within the movement.7 Al Qaeda has displayed striking characteristics, particularly since the mid-1990s, which encapsulate the inherent insurgent qualities of the movement, distancing itself from the terrorist misnomer. Terrorist groups do not issue Declarations of War, as Osama bin Laden did on behalf of Al Qaeda in 1998.8 Neither do terrorist groups carry out atrocities commensurate with acts of war, as Al Qaeda arguably did on 9/11. This insurgent movement is not constrained by concerns harboured by 'traditional' terrorist groups of limiting the number of civilian casualties in their attacks due to concerns over the legitimacy of their cause. In part this is due to the ubiquity of martyrdom in the jihadi conception of Islam as well as through the blanket interpretation of all Americans and other Westerners, civilian or military, as being complicit in Western hegemony and the perceived injustices and insults meted out to the Islamic world. Indeed, such is the animosity towards the West, particularly the US, in large parts of the Muslim world that mass casualty attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda do not necessarily alienate mass popular opinion in such countries, but can indeed mobilise it in support of what is construed as the oppressed rising up against the oppressors. In short, the ends overshadow the means. Furthermore, Al Qaeda's tactic of not claiming the credit for successful attacks against America or 'apostate' regime targets, such as the Khobar Towers military barracks attack in Saudi Arabia that killed nineteen Americans in 1996, runs contrary to conventional terrorist wisdom where there is often a clamour to be associated with events.9 This can be explained, firstly by Al Qaeda's desire to utilise terrorism as one of many tactical tools to achieve a wider strategic goal. This one tactic alone should not define the group, nor blinker the political and military authorities. Secondly, it demonstrates that the instigation of violence is not their only aim. By delegating credit for attacks it sends a very clear message that that the jihad against the West is not limited to a small band of ideologues but
is in fact a tangible sentiment that is actionable around the world. Thirdly, such behaviour so 'uncharacteristic' of a terrorist group helps underlie the point that Al Qaeda is not merely a terrorist group with a difference. Its characteristics, strategy, tactics, organisational structure and its international presence indicate that Al Qaeda is indeed a global insurgent movement with a clear political commitment to dismantling the existing world order and rebuilding it in their own image. Terrorism is not the motive or the perpetuating catalyst, but is part of the far wider ideological struggle able to be perpetrated by a global network of myriad affiliates united by a shared strategic vision and a common tactical repertoire.
