ABSTRACT
Traditional epistemology defends knowledge as a unique relationship between subjective knowers and objects known, aloof perceivers and things perceived. This central feature of epistemology was framed long before the rise of experimental inquiry, and John Dewey straightforwardly aimed to eliminate its influence in order to introduce some of the subtleties of his reconstruction of as-yet-unmodern epistemology. It may help to set some of his positions in contrast with one of his more recent admirers. Dewey held that dismissal of the idea of reason, logic, and knowledge as aloof, transcendent, and non-contextual happily spells an end to the pseudo-problems manufactured by much traditional metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. It concurrently promotes a recovery of philosophical engagement with practical human problems of experience, knowing, moral life, and art. In philosophy of science the debate has nowadays shifted to one between constructivists and realists, so it will help to situate Dewey in this context.
