Freedom and virtue

The main idea of this short book has been to introduce the idea of freedom as historically produced and contested. Ideas of freedom have become centrally important during certain historical periods rather than others. In my account I have suggested that we look carefully at debates within Ancient Greece, the European Enlightenment, the Cold War and what is sometimes called the radical 1960s, though there are of course other periods when ideas of freedom have been intensely debated, such as the Victorian era or during the Russian revolution. We have also seen the rise of neo-liberal thinking, which has radically altered our common understandings of freedom. In a sense the historical thrust of the debate has been to argue, against Marxism and liberal ideas of negative liberty, that more convincing as well as more feasible ideas of freedom can be found in the tradition of social liberalism. This tradition, as we have seen, has mainly emerged out of American and European traditions of thinking but is not their exclusive property. The basis of this idea is that a free society needs to draw upon the values of liberty as well as social solidarity. Freedom here is both a public and private virtue. That we are able to lead the lives of our choosing without being overwhelmed by the anxiety of losing our employment, while having access to adequate resources, a state that can care for us and an education and public sphere that can stimulate

our intelligence have all been central features in the argument. As we saw these concerns stretch through a diversity of thinkers from John Dewey to George Orwell and from Leonard Hobhouse to Richard Hoggart. They have of course differed in their concerns and passions, but to all of them a free society was more than the freedom to work or starve or more recently consume. This tradition offers a different understanding of freedom than that which simply assumes it is the ability to become wealthy or indeed simply to do what you like without interference. Here I have offered a historical critique of the dominant values of mainstream society rather than simply describing the transition of one way of thinking about freedom to another. Of course social reality is never that simple and social liberalism or democratic socialism continues to be part of our culture. However, it seems to me at least, that these values are currently under attack. Of course there will be many readers of this book who may not share

these values. They may either think all of this talk of freedom is simply bunkum and that we would be better off without it. They prefer instead other values like happiness or security. Freedom for them offers little other than constant questioning or uncertainty. Others may argue that they enjoy being consumers and think that choice, fun and the thrill of the purchase offers more than anything that I have mentioned. This is not merely a difference of opinion, but one where people genuinely choose different values from the ones that I am advocating. Of course I could point to the consequences of these arguments. Is a life without freedom actually worth living? If we are not free to become ourselves in a meaningful way what does that say about us as human beings? Further, what of the high cost of consumer lifestyles, often paid for by the poor of the planet or the ecological devastation it leaves in its wake? Here I make these arguments not because I think we are liberal socialists by nature, but that on balance these views and values have historically been on the right side of the argument, rejecting both neoliberalism and more authoritarian regimes. The version of freedom defended here is not utopian ushering in a perfect society, but is historically realisable. It may of course be argued that the golden age of liberal socialism has passed and we now have to adapt to more marketdriven societies with good reason due to the financial and debt crisis and the rise of global competition. The tradition of social liberalism will have

to adapt itself to new sociological realities, but this does not change the guiding principles of a good (or at least) better society. This is, however, a value judgment with which the reader is free to disagree. Freedom is less about the removal of external constraints than about

understanding the wider society and historical change. Freedom is also less an abstract set of principles than it is having access to a historical narrative. The idea of freedom is intimately related to our ability to tell a story about who we are, what traditions are important, and where we are currently headed. If liberalism is a tradition it is one that needs to be able to tell a story about history. Too much time has been spent by political theorists arguing in esoteric debates of which the public can make little sense. Who on reading much liberal philosophy is inspired to take up the banner of freedom? Not really that many is my fear. The principles at stake are of course important, but they need to be attached to an ability to tell a story about our current identities. If our story about freedom is changing (as I fear it is) we need to be able to understand how this is as much a philosophical problem as it is a sociological and historical one. Part of the narrative about freedom needs to be a story we can tell about the arrival of a consumer society that has implications for the ways in which many people view freedom and their own identities. If this society began to emerge in the 1950s it is crucially related to the impact of credit cards, suburban living, the conversion of the home into a leisure centre, the rise of technological culture and of course the dominance of television and privatised living. If we add into this picture neo-liberalism and globalisation it is not surprising that our shared ideas of freedom have altered. We might also add into this context more contemporary fears about fundamentalism and political indifference. If a world of passionate ethnic belonging is one threat to a diverse society, then fundamentalism of various kinds is another. How can we guard ourselves against the threats of consumerist indifference and exclusive tribalism? Of course we may not be able to do so but, rather than trusting in the innate good sense of our fellow citizens or shrugging our shoulders, part of the answer might lie within a genuinely civic education. The idea of a civic education is not to indoctrinate children into

becoming good social liberals. It is instead the need to provide an education that emphasises the virtues of freedom. The idea of citizenship being based upon the idea of virtue can be traced back of course to the

Ancient Greeks in general and Aristotle in particular. Stressing the virtues of freedom emphasises what it is good to become. The virtuous citizen is not only good but someone who knows how to act in different situations. The danger here is that the idea of the virtuous citizen simply becomes (as indeed it was in Ancient Greece) a way for the middle classes to feel superior. This is indeed a distinct possibility, but it depends upon the skilful ability of educators to make sure this does not happen. Further, such an argument is clearly objectionable as citizens should be free to become other kinds of being. Many of our citizens will remain indifferent to matters of public concern, preferring instead to interest themselves in other activities. The idea is, however, to gently consider how the virtues of freedom might be fostered, not to impose them in an authoritarian manner. Citizens of a particular community will continue to hold a diversity of views. Another argument might be that in terms of offering a civic education we need to be entirely ‘neutral’ as to the loyalties displayed by our students as long as they are in keeping with the rule of law. It is not for the state or any other body to prejudice the minds of the young on contentious questions. The problem here is that there is no such thing as a neutral society. Our languages, histories, family backgrounds and broader cultural traditions have already been selected for us. Moreover it is better to be honest and admit that states and modern economies require citizens to be loyal, have a sense of connection to the host society and aim to make something of themselves. If we admit all of this (as I think we must) we are already a long way from neutrality. Finally, others might think that freedom can be simply left to itself in republics based upon equal rights and the rule of law. Recalling John Dewey (1977) we might be born relational beings but we only become members of democratic communities by learning how to. Indeed, if civic citizenship depends upon rights, responsibilities and a sense of belonging, then it needs to be more than a common set of procedures. Freedom needs to become an actual practice whereby new citizens learn to test their ideas, opinions and concerns against others. This can only be achieved by having the confidence to think for oneself, being creative, voicing concerns and acquiring the skilled art of listening. Freedom requires the practice of democratic dialogue. This practice is as much about living in a family as it is about living in a community.