chapter  6
Conclusion: The Dialectic of Utopia and Ideology
Pages 20

What this impossibility of immanence means in practice is that the dialectical reversal must always involve a painful "decentering" of the consciousness of the individual subject, whom it confronts with a determination (whether of the Freudian or the political unconscious) that must necessarily be felt as extrinsic or external to conscious experience. It would be a mistake to think that anyone ever really learns to live with this ideological "Copernican revolution," any more than the most lucid subjects of psychoanalysis ever really achieve the habit of lucidity and self-knowledge; the approach to the Real is at best fitful, the retreat from it into this or that form of intellectual comfort perpetual. But if this is so, it follows that we must bracket that whole dimension of the critique of the Marxist doctrine of determination by social being which springs from exasperation with this unpleasant reflexivity. In particular, it should be stressed that the process of totalization outlined in our opening chapter offers no way out of this the "labor and suffering of the negative," but must necessarily be accompanied by it, if the process is to be authentically realized.