ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to provide a theory-driven, comparative analysis of how
variations in the relationship between ministers and government backbenchers
in the national parliaments of European Union (EU) Member States co-vary
with differences in the way the respective parliaments scrutinise and influence
‘their’ national governments in the EU law-making process. Given the high
levels of party cohesion in the parliamentary and semi-presidential systems
of government characteristic of most EU Member States, the effectiveness
of parliamentary oversight and influence depends crucially – albeit not
exclusively – on what Anthony King referred to as ‘intra-party mode’ in
executive-legislative relations (see below).1 To what extent do members of
the governing parliamentary parties have institutional opportunities to
influence the government’s bargaining position before and during negotiations
in the Council of Ministers? Where do backbenchers have opportunities to
I owe thanks to Paolo Dardanelli, Ersun Kurtulus¸ and Jane O’Mahony for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. It goes without saying that I am fully responsible for all remaining opacities and inaccuracies.
