Reconstruction of Infrastructure in Iraq: end to a means or means to an end?

ABSTRACT Infrastructure reconstruction in Iraq was planned as a project-driven straight-line activity. The USA prepared for it for many months on the back of its planned invasion of Iraq. It was predominantly devised as a top-down operation with an assumption of derived benefits to the economy and the population. The plan appeared to be based on the assumption that peace would quickly be restored. The reality was different-rising insurgency led to a slowed rate of reconstruction, thus leading to increasing ambivalence by the Iraqi populace towards the Coalition Provisional Authority as progress fell far short of its expectations. Sustainable infrastructure was perhaps never a prime objective, but the unexpected level of post-war violent conflict saw rebuilding infrastructure as a prime means for creating short-term employment and visible effect, with the intention of diffusing anti-Coalition momentum. This paper will explore the dilemma of facilitating reconstruction for short-term aims and whether in these circumstances it is possible to maintain a long-term vision. It will also analyse to what extent the Iraqi people have genuinely participated in reconstruction plans and whether the eventual outcomes might have been different if a truly participative approach had been taken.