ABSTRACT
The following pages are not merely a concluding chapter that summarizes the book so far, since each chapter has its own conclusion. There is no need for a comprehensive conclusion; instead, the following is an epilogue that seeks to reflect upon the growing conflictual relationship between the State of Israel and the indigenous Palestinian minority within it. The various chapters have demonstrated that this relationship is complex and cannot be explicated by one-dimensional models. The sociological and political developments within the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel and the continuous estrangement policies of the state vis-à-vis this community have led to growing tensions that broaden the spaces of confrontation between the two sides. The leadership of the Arab-Palestinian community and the leadership of the state, especially the right-wing government that won power in early 2009, understand that state–minority relations could be viewed in internal Israeli terms, on the one hand, but can also be perceived as a central component of the broader Israeli–Palestinian conflict on the other. Both leaderships, although not homogeneous, have not clearly decided which understanding is preferable. As a result, one can speak of a spectrum of relationships, where relations between the state and the Arab-Palestinian community within it keep shifting without actually reaching any of the edges of the spectrum. One cannot speak of a confrontational or alternatively harmonic relationship. These relations keep shifting, mostly toward the confrontational edge. The following pages seek to provide an analysis of the gaps between the expectations of both sides, as a central cause for the nature of their relationship. Before moving ahead, it is important to clarify that the following analysis reduces the complexities of the relationship between the state and the Arab-Palestinian community into a relationship between two homogeneous players. After having analyzed the various dimensions of the relationship and its complexities in the previous chapters, one can allow some intended reductionism in order to sharpen the analysis and reflect the main trends taking place in the relationship between the two sides. The “personification” of the state and the minority also does not meet the main theoretical conceptualizations of this study, namely the preliminary perception that neither the State of Israel nor the Arab-Palestinian minority are monolithic entities and any understanding of their mutual behavior has to be based on multi-dimensional models of understanding. The state is not one unified political agent. It is a complex institutional structure that could have contradictory policies. The Arab-Palestinian minority is also a complex social entity, in which different groups could have contradictory interests. Nonetheless, a reductive view of complex processes, groups and institutions is sometimes indispensable in order to clarify certain developments.
