ABSTRACT
Latin American lawyers have been commonly portrayed as members of a privileged social group with important influence in many areas. Lawyers have been seen as power brokers, social entrepreneurs, and nation builders. Over time, they have been able to form a permanent and steady elite, which has shaped the ways in which the public and private sectors operate. As described in previous work (Gómez 2003, 2008), Venezuelan lawyers are not the exception. The social and political conditions under which the country developed allowed networks of lawyers to attain significant power, thus enabling them to manipulate the ways in which different parts of the political system functioned, including the courts. This chapter describes how the operation of the Venezuelan judiciary has
been traditionally controlled by networks of lawyers, judges and other political actors who have attained significant power and influence, and how members of the business sector have greatly benefited from this. It also explains how social and political changes occurred in that country during the late 1990s which modified the power balance, thus shifting the position of its different actors, but enabling the same social network structures to remain in place. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section I describes how
Venezuelan lawyers have formed a select group that has played key roles during different historical periods, from their contribution to the consolidation of the country’s political and intellectual leadership during the nineteenth century, to their rise as power brokers bridging the public and private sectors during the economic and social expansions that took place throughout most of the twentieth century. Section II explains how the political transition from dictatorship to democracy also shaped the role of lawyers in society, particularly in light of the numerous opportunities created by the oil boom of the 1970s, which strengthened the business sector and gave rise to the powerful elite that I call “business lawyers.” This section also shows how, during the same time period, the presence of strong political parties and of powerful clientele networks facilitated the rise of clan-like groups (judicial tribes) whose main goal was to manipulate the courts and exert influence on public officials for the benefit of certain influential groups. Finally, Section III explains how, in spite of the radical political transition that took place in the late 1990s, which led to the disappearance of the traditional
elites, the new regime created the conditions for the emergence of new networks similar to those that existed in the past, revealing that personal connections are still very important and remain vital in making the justice system work.
