chapter  8
The rejection of ‘expressionism’. The ‘logos’ as the ‘rule’ of thought. Brice Parain
Pages 3

He deals first with the refutation, by Socrates, of the earliest Greek theory of the rigid correspondence between words and objects in the sensible world. The adoption of the theory of Ideas was the consequence of this refutation, since the act of naming was seen by Socrates to be in itself inductive, in so far as it implies the recognition of a kind, and not merely of one particular object. In modern times Descartes took language to be the representation of intelligible truth, but this led to too many difficulties, for, as Pascal pointed out, the confusion and distortion brought into clear thought by the passions is too great and too pervasive. A crisis and impasse was thus brought about by what was, in Brice Parain’s view, the bankruptcy of French philosophy towards the end of the seventeenth century.1