ABSTRACT
Public commentary in the past decade about expanding great power interest and involvement in the Persian Gulf has often laid greater emphasis on the regional role of Iran than on the other littoral states. One of the most far-reaching consequences of the October 1973 War and its aftermath, and particularly after Iran’s revolution, has been a fundamental shift in focus away from Iran towards other factors in the area. The Arab oil embargo and subsequent steep rise in petroleum prices, the rapid accumulation of monetary wealth by several Arab states and the expansion and deepening of Western and especially American-Arabian Peninsula ties have resulted, in effect, in greater attention being paid to the Arab states in the Gulf. The reasons are not surprising: 6 of the 7 littoral states are Arab (counting the 7 members of the United Arab Emirates as a single state) and these polities, not Iran, are responsible for most of the area’s oil production, possess the overwhelming majority of its petroleum reserves, and control the bulk of its impressive financial holdings.
