ABSTRACT
Chapter 2 discussed the functioning of the dynamic in the international system that has prevailed thus far: the balancing of power. This chapter deals with the status of the balancing of power and the implications of it functioning differently in a unipolar system. The crucial question regards what the reduced importance of the balancing of power implies for stability and security within and to the system. Robert Jervis posed the question of what should be considered the dependent variable in a unipolar system in which ‘world war is less of a problem’ (Jervis 2009: 195) and concluded that ‘perhaps the obvious dependent variable is the system’s durability’ (Jervis 2009: 197). Indeed, it has been debated whether a unipolar system should be regarded as durable (Wohlforth 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008) or merely a state of transition (Waltz 1993, 2000). The argument here is that it is robust but not necessarily durable. In this chapter we also focus on the functioning of the unipolar system and thereby on stability and security within the system. In other words, what is a unipolar system like as long as it persists? The balancing of power has been regarded as the ‘organizing principle’ in the realist paradigm, and symmetrical great power balancing has been regarded as the dynamic affecting the conditions of all states in neorealist theory. According to Waltz, an international system is more stable with a smaller number of great powers, as ‘complexities and uncertainties multiply’ as numbers increase (Waltz 1979: 165). Implicitly, this also applies for most states (the non-great powers). Neorealist theory deals with the self-help condition and its implications for all states. Indeed, particular attention is given to great powers due to their strength and explanatory status, but the structure also affects the other states: the self-help condition that promotes states to seek security is affected by the variation of the numbers of great powers; consequently, the context in which the non-great powers operate is also affected by variation. Dealing with this, however, demands that we also focus on challenges originating from the structure within the system – beyond the issue of hegemonic rivalry or the superpower’s ability to behave in a manner that other states might endorse or at least accept. Whether a unipolar system should be considered comparatively ‘peaceful’ or not also depends on the probability of war involving non-great powers.
