ABSTRACT
In the literature, Switzerland is frequently described and analysed as an exemplar of direct democracy, federalism, and consociationalism. Less studied are the institutional features of government–parliament relations, even though they follow an unusual pattern from a comparative vantage point. Switzerland is neither a truly presidential nor a truly parliamentary system. It is not presidential since there is no separate origin with a direct election of the government. This seems to imply strong ties between government and parliament with a weak agenda setting position of the legislature (Tsebelis 2002). It is not parliamentary since the government is not dependent on the support of the parliament during a legislative term. This seems to imply weak ties between government and parliament with a strong agenda setting position of the legislature. In this chapter, we broaden this traditional classificatory scheme by considering both the institutional powers of the parliament vis-à-vis the government and a broader, system-based perspective involving the whole political decision-making process. We argue that despite strong institutional disadvantages, the Swiss government nevertheless manages to seize agenda setting power, mainly due to strong positional advantages.
