ABSTRACT
O ver the past two decades, a substantial body of research has established that attitudes operate at two distinct levels. More precisely, evaluations based on controlled or deliberate processes have been distinguished from evaluations operating outside of conscious awareness or control (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, in press; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). Research on implicit attitudes examines evaluations or feelings that are not available to introspection or that cannot be consciously controlled. To grasp the enthusiasm for this topic, it suffi ces to skim the premier research outlets in the fi eld. Our journals are replete with theoretical and methodological contributions shedding light on the vicissitudes and ramifi cations of implicit attitudes. At the same time, some have met these recent developments with skepticism, and have triggered stimulating debates inherent to paradigmatic shifts in scientifi c disciplines (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).
