ABSTRACT
To the extent that the criticism voiced in the last chapter is valid, the fault lies largely with the donor because it “controls the rules of the game” (McNeil, 1981:102). But few institutional systems reform themselves without sustained external pressure. In the case of foreign aid, as noted, pressure for improvement is hindered by the inherent political unpopularity of the issue among legislators and the lack of sustained interest group pressure. Under these conditions, foreign aid policy continues to be the result of a mixedmotive bargaining process which produces complex programs often removed from the needs of Third World recipients. The purpose of this chapter is to fit the complexity of this process into a simplifying framework that can point the way to reform. While most US public policies have been given this cleansing treatment on a regular basis by scholars and practitioners alike, and despite the vast extant literature on US foreign aid, few theorybuilding efforts have been attempted.
