“Total Strategy” and the “securocratisation” of the government, 1972–1978
In Chapter 2, the development of the apartheid state’s national security architecture and its capabilities to conduct both security intelligence and counter-insurgency activities was outlined. To support all of these elements, and to ensure that the state’s entire intelligence capability was geared towards supporting it, a national security strategy was required. This would form initially around the “Total National Strategy” and later, following a significant evolution in both the state’s security operations and the ANC’s revolutionary onslaught, around a “Total Counter-revolutionary Strategy”. As this chapter discusses, these strategies – symbiotically – both became the key determinants of the intelligence requirements of the state, at both operational and strategic levels, and were in turn driven and, to a great extent, determined by the nature of the intelligence dispensation developed by the state. In this sense, the intelligence-led national security strategy of apartheid South Africa became self-sustaining, almost paradoxically losing – it will be argued – the ability to see outside of the security paradigm created by this intelligence paradigm.