Challengers in a weak polity

In a weak polity “normal” and “revolutionary” challenges are difficult to distinguish from each other. There have not been enough patterned, routinized leadership contests to establish what constitutes “normal.” The polity’s weakness means that there are alternative nascent or active or parallel polities at work. In a fluid polity, attempting to rewrite the rules in one’s favor is common. Where there are multiple, overlapping authorities, a “challenger” (better described as a political entrepreneur, since the goal may not be to unseat the incumbent state leader) will seek to maximize autonomy in the domain with maximal political survival prospects. Where the ground rules are not well-established or enforced, one way for challengers to unseat incumbents and obtain office is to change the rules, thereby appropriating powers for themselves and restricting the political authority enjoyed by the incumbent leader. In this chapter, statements by leaders, affinity group members, and polity obser-

vers shed light on strategic paths to de jure and de facto quasi-states in a weak state context. While the examples given here are embedded in a historical context, the purpose is not to offer exhaustive historical narratives, nor is it to survey all contenders for political ascendancy. Rather, it is to demonstrate that across challengers from different backgrounds, a common political opportunity-the chance to pursue de facto and de jure quasi-states-has frequently been exploited. The broadly shared strategic expectation is that building a quasi-state may further political survival goals. If these efforts are accommodated within the polity’s institutional framework, then the state will likely survive and even thrive in the long term. Incumbents’ inability or unwillingness to either fully repress or institutionally accommodate quasi-states risks state failure, as has been demonstrated through Bangladesh’s secession. Post-colonial South Asia has seen numerous secessionist and “autonomist”

movements. In India, the Naga, Mizo, the Bodo, Assamese, Meitei, Sikh “Khalistan,” and Kashmir movements; in Sri Lanka, the Tamil Eelam movement; in Bhutan, the Lothshampa autonomist movement; and in Bangladesh, the Chittagong Hill Tracts autonomist conflicts. There have been four international wars and 18 armed “internal conflicts” in the first 50 years since independence, as well as numerous violent unrest incidents, resulting in 4.3 million deaths according to one measure. “Civil” society is often militarized, with death squads, private

armies, militias, and armed organized crime operating in sizeable areas. At least six national leaders have been assassinated (Stewart and Hyat, 2002: 108-112). Agitational politics are a persistent phenomenon. Contentious tactics such as public demonstrations, strikes, and organized violence all show that a leader or group has the ability to mobilize and deploy force. Religious and sectarian rivalries, termed “communal” tensions, have been

expressed in violent forms between Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, as well as intraMuslim sectarian tensions. Population displacements are sizeable. Conflict groups inside Pakistan often draw on external support and become domestic conduits for international rivalries. While there are autonomist or secessionist groups elsewhere, the perceived threat is severe in Pakistan. In interviews, several Pakistanis asserted that some substate groups actively seek to destroy the Pakistani federation (Interview with former Sindh province official Ghazi Salahuddin, March 2009; with Daily News editor S.M. Fazal, 2009; and others). Crucially, Pakistan has experienced disintegration. The process leading to East Pakistan’s secession in 1971 both exemplifies and amplifies quasi-state political opportunities for challengers. According to LOPS, revolutionary challengers aim to bring the disenfranchised

into the selectorate. Challengers in Pakistan have often mobilized the disenfranchised by offering political inclusion in a new polity, in which they are better off than they were under the prior arrangement. Challengers who do not attain leadership office in a weak polity may nevertheless obtain or retain office in a quasi-state. A challenger’s political survival may be obtained or even furthered by failure to obtain national office. A maximal assumption is that challengers prefer their own leadership on the largest, most secure scale they can possibly attain. Whatever ideology a challenger espouses, it is assumed that greatest jurisdiction is preferred. Quasi-states allow such jurisdiction. Authority in a quasi-state gives one the ability to be a “general in one’s own army,” rather than merely a lieutenant in another’s army. This Venn diagram shows aspirants to “Quasi-state,” and “national office,” and

additional possibilities. Set A represents those aspiring for national office; set B represents those aspiring to quasi-state leadership. Someone can pursue leadership that is simultaneously quasi-state and national office (intersection of sets A and B;

this means leading a quasi-state that captures the state, or obtaining state leadership and then creating a quasi-state or both together) or both (union of sets A and B (this would be a feudal lord who obtains high office and has separate authority in both domains)). Or aspirants could be A and not B, or B and not A. In a weak state, there are three challenger types: those who seek formal office

defined by the state, those who seek to rule in quasi-states, and those who seek both and will settle for one, and advocate for the maximum authority possible for whichever they acquire. Creating a quasi-state or threatening a secessionist challenge could be a route to office, a way to bargain for membership in the national rulership structure, or a way to pursue special privileges and benefits. Not all quasi-states are overtly secessionist. Not all secessionists have a quasi-

state. But quasi-states tend to be autonomist and/or secessionist, and secessionist threats are made more credible by quasi-states. A quasi-state performs certain state functions, but does not have recognition as a sovereign entity, and may not have sought such recognition. Powerful landlords represent small-scale quasi-states. They have coercive instru-

ments, such as private jails and armed supporters, to help control tenant farmers and others within their fiefs. State agents such as police and bureaucracy are typically under landlord influence (Interviews, 2009). Frequently, landlords are associated with a local religious leadership, such as a pir or sajjada nasheen, or the landlord family itself may lay claim to religious leadership status. Landlords also have participant power in the electoral political process, being able to mobilize people for the polls. One Sindhi migrant to Karachi described carrying out this behavior pattern in her new home-she simply voted for whomever her landlord told her to (Interview, 2008). It is not unusual to have several political parties represented in one landlord family, so that whoever dominates the legislature or other formal office, the family remains a favored constituent. Most challengers who successfully obtained office were closely linked to a

previous ruling coalition, and then embarked on their own and broke away. Ayub Khan was in Ghulam Mohammad’s ruling cabinet, as was Iskander Mirza. Ayub Khan’s presence placed a sitting commander-in-chief in a civilian cabinet for the first time. Yahya Khan and Z.A. Bhutto were both close collaborators with Ayub Khan. Zia ul-Haq was picked by Bhutto to be chief of army staff. Nawaz was supported by Zia ul-Haq and the ISI, which helped cobble together the IJI coalition. Musharraf was elevated by Nawaz over other choices for the role of chief of army staff. Being in the leadership circle enables one figure to make a power grab and consolidate personal authority over others. This pattern seems to have been the prevalent one-even in the 1970 election Bhutto, although a civilian, had allies from previous military connections as well as wide support. Mujib ur-Rehman had no such allies. As identity markers that demarcate difference, define groupness, and bind

political communities, “Islam” and “ethnicity” are comparable. Ethnicity carries less formalized debates about “law,” and may not have the same coherent yet contested normative prescriptive element. But ethno-nationalism does bring with it a political program that is tied to “ethnicity.” Similarly, Islamism brings with it a

political program tied to “Islam.” Each mobilizes symbol, and attempts to convert social capital into political mobilization. Just as ethnic associations can be considered “civil society,” so can religious associations (Varshney, 2002). Sharply demarcated affinity groups and clear outgroups (particularly scapegoats)

provide conducive contexts to challengers seeking quasi-states. Religio-nationalism and ethno-nationalism provide such social divisions. Religion and ethnicity are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In an extreme analogy, “Islam” and “ethnic identity” are cards in a deck that a challenger has. The particular deck and the strength of “Islam” or “ethnicity” or other mobilizing symbols and instruments varies challenger by challenger. Playing the ethnicity card threatens agitation, conflict, and trouble for a national leader. Hence, it makes sense for the leader to coopt or repress this. Replying with the Islam card is one way to retain political legitimacy. Appeals to religious affinity are ways to weaken ethnic affinity group ties. But the Islam card helps other challengers that can seek to outbid the state competitively on its Islamic-ness or choose a sectarian challenge. In some cases, an ethnic affinity and a religious affinity may overlap, providing an affinity alliance on which quasi-state authority can rest. Challengers have a political survival option not available in the same form

elsewhere. In Pakistan, a failed candidate for national leadership can nevertheless carve out space in which to exercise authority, in some cases. The endgame is never entirely clear, except by death. Even exile can be reversed. Entire polities can be reorganized and boundaries redrawn. Existing rules can and will be reworked, often to favor the incumbent; the challenger will try to do the same thing by redrawing boundaries and emphasizing different jurisdictions. This “revolutionary” option is close to normal political behavior in Pakistan. What might be considered normal in a stable democracy, such as free and fair elections on a universal adult franchise, constitutes a revolutionary change in Pakistan and may produce a revolutionary outcome. The new selection mechanism may enhance the selectorate and bring new groups into the winning coalition and outsiders to national office. That happened with Mujib ur-Rehman’s election in 1970. Then, the electoral result was disregarded, and civil war followed. The common thread here is challenger paths under particular incumbents.

The two major themes that arise are: challengers from within one’s winning coalition and leadership circle (appointees themselves try to consolidate authority at their patrons’ expense, often rewriting rules in the process), and challengers who can when it suits them pursue autonomism, redrawing polity boundaries in de facto and de jure ways that maximize their authority. Challenge is a process reflecting strategic interdependence, a complex decision-making condition under which anticipated choices by other actors affect one’s present choice. This chapter has not attempted to provide a comprehensive account of the socioeconomic circumstances leading to unrest. Those belong to the macro forces that impact group consciousness and affinity ties, and provide fuel for mobilization. Challengers seek plum assignments to enrich themselves and their supporters.

In other words, they may simply join the winning coalition if the price is right. This may alienate some in their affinity group. Another facet in challenger

behavior is that the challengers’ parties can themselves split as internal challengers pursue a secessionist logic, sacrificing party unit to obtain office in a splinter group. Like states, quasi-states need resources to survive and engage in war-making,

state-making, and protection. In a more primitive fashion, quasi-states replicate state extraction strategies, emphasizing a taxation strategy or an external financing strategy. They can rely on member donations, coercive extraction, and financing by external or distant agents with other agendas. These are difficult to map out for specific groups because they are largely clandestine activities. Nevertheless, interview data yield some near-unanimous perceptions. The two most common forms are bhatta, which taxes individuals and business, and financing from “agencies.” The term “bhatta” which can be translated as “bonus” can be found as far back as

at least the eighteenth century, when Lord Clive found the civil servants, military officers, and soldiers of the East India Company all taking bhatta. Clive took steps to cut down on such bribery and corruption (Mahmud, 1988: 191). In addition to side-payments given to predatory state agents, bhatta has increasingly come to mean protection money and involuntary donations to non-state actors. In my own fieldwork, numerous shopkeepers described tanzeems-social organizations, usually politically affiliated militias or thugs, who come to collect bhatta-in practice an extorted “donation,” or protection money. Non-contribution invites assault or worse. The merchants interviewed in fieldwork were understandably reluctant to share details, butmost acknowledgedmaking routine bhatta contributions to tanzeems. This shows “extraction” behavior, one state characteristic. It is widely believed that “agencies” finance and manipulate religious and ethnic

groups. Interviewees from many backgrounds expressed their conviction that “agencies” were involved. Usually this term refers to the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Intelligence Bureau, the military and civilian intelligence agencies in Pakistan that have provided covert aid to specific groups. One interviewee described these agencies as driven by “hyperpatriotism” that gave them license to manipulate domestic political processes with aggressive action without regard to law or conventional morality (Interview, 2009). Their actions might be designed to splinter a troublesome organization or to prop up one against another. In some cases, “agencies” refer to wealthy patrons inside “The Establishment,” or

foreign backers seeking to extend their influence, undermine rivals, and carry out proxy wars on Pakistani soil. A group’s leadership might have businesses such as restaurants, but the income generated is significantly greater than that which restaurants ordinarily make. In general, service industries like restaurants can be used as fronts for money-laundering because their products, customers, and receipts are difficult to monitor. Profitable criminal activities such as smuggling are also widely suspected (Interviews, 2008, 2009). Politically relevant group identity and religious affiliation are intricately inter-

twined in the Pakistani case. This may be because the state was founded on “Muslim” or “Islamic” nationalism, as seen in the Muslim League’s pre-Partition slogan “Islam in danger.” “Muslims” were declared a nationality based on a

coherent, distinctive common culture and language. Jinnah proclaimed in his 1944 letter to Gandhi: