ABSTRACT
Proponents of social learning theory would emphasise a detailed examination of the social networks of those with mental disorder: to what extent do the beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of family members, caregivers, neighbours, friends and others increase or decrease the likelihood of criminal activity? Are those with mental disorder more likely to mix with a particular
stratum of society where crime or the use of violence is more acceptable? Such an approach would historically resonate with theories that stressed the importance of the volatile and transient nature of some poorer communities – often located in what members of the University of Chicago Sociology Department used to call zones in transition – where weak controls, both formal and informal, operated and delinquency was nurtured over generations. And it is not that people in such communities are more criminogenic, but rather that the very nature of the community, with its vestigial levels of control, makes them feel more anxious and less inclined to establish the networks of interdependence which build strong communities (see, on the contribution of social disorganisation theory, Silver 2000). More recently, the work of the MacArthur group would emphasise the role of particular neighbourhoods in facilitating or reducing the likelihood of violence: ‘violence by persons with mental disorders may be, in part, a function of the high crime neighborhoods in which they typically reside’ (Monahan et al, 2001:60; see also Silver et al, 1999). Indeed, this work resonates with that of Sampson et al (1997) who have argued, based on a study of over 300 neighbourhoods in Chicago, that ‘collective effi cacy’, a combination of the area’s social cohesion and the preparedness of residents to intervene to promote the common good, is linked to reduced violence. Are those with mental disorder exposed to more stressful life events and more likely to experience negative affective states like anger or fear? Feeling under threat, and the fear that it produces, can facilitate violence amongst the ordered; if a belief that one is under threat, and the negative emotional states that accompany that, are associated with particular delusional states, then the probability of violence may be enhanced. If such beliefs arise in the context of an environment where violence is regarded as a problem solver, then the route to enhanced rates of interpersonal violence can be mapped, if not necessarily followed. So, are mentally disordered individuals exposed to disproportionately more negative and stressful life events, perhaps partly through the process of victimisation, facilitated by a process of stigmatisation? And does the process of coercion or perceived coercion to which mentally disordered people are exposed add to their sense of injustice and grievance, in turn contributing to the precipitation of violence? Indeed, James (1995) has brought a number of these elements together in his argument that the neo-liberal policies pursued in the 1980s, and the economic damage done to working-class young men thereby, could contribute to levels of paranoia and subsequent violence. Whilst this is a heady-brew of interacting factors, the causes of violence are never likely to be straightforward. Ironically, whilst those with mental disorder may be exposed to greater formal social control, through the processes of coercion and detention, are they equally subject to less informal social control because of the nature of their personal relationships? As Silver (2006) posits does mental disorder
increase the likelihood of instability and breakdown in social relationships? Do such changes in social bonds increase the likelihood of violence? Are they subject to fewer interdependent systems of obligation and restraint? Are relationships infused with tension, leading to reciprocal antagonism and a greater propensity to be subject to victimisation? The exploratory work of Colombo (2007) above documents the day-to-day aggression and interpersonal violence to which those with mental disorder are subjected. And as we are frequently reminded, violence occurs in a context: it is rarely a unilateral event. Does the rejection that comes with the stigma of mental disorder lead generally to lower levels of social support? Is mental disorder therefore a risk factor for rejection by others? That category of criminological theories termed ‘control theories’ (eg Hirschi, 1969) would start from the proposition that crime is inherently rewarding and that law-breaking is potentially widespread: the critical questions then surround the issue of what prevents people from offending. The strength of an individual’s bond to society determines whether people comply with the rules: and that bond is based on elements such as their attachment to others, their involvement in society, their commitment to a conforming lifestyle and whether they believe they ought to obey the law. Subsequently, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) developed the thesis to include aspects relating to impulsivity and self-control, arguing that crime is facilitated in conditions of low self-control. This begins to resonate with the control-override thesis; and, whilst this has not been satisfactorily demonstrated to have an independent effect generally in offending by those with delusions of control-override, it has potential in respect of mentally disordered offending per se. Are such offenders more likely to be risk-takers, to lack sympathy for the victim (possibly, with respect to personality disorder, since this can be one of the diagnostic criteria), or to be less able to postpone pleasure? Or is it that some mentally disordered people, partly as a result of stigmatisation, live in an atmosphere where their social ties are signifi cantly less strong or less stable than for the ordered population? Again, the thesis may be true for some individuals; but it is not true across the board. And control theory needs to take account not just of the effects of mental disorder, but also of the more commonplace effects of gender (for an excellent account see Hagan et al, 1979). At fi rst sight, rational choice theory might seem an incongruous application theoretically. But, as asserted earlier, there is no reason to presuppose that those with mental disorder routinely engage in offending behaviour for any more or less rational reasons than the mentally ordered. Whilst intuitively it has been attractive to portray those with mental disorder as irrational or out of control, there is no convincing empirical evidence to support this. In any event, rational choice theory places less emphasis on the nature of offenders and more on the contexts in which offending occurs: target hardening, controlling access to the opportunities for crime and increasing
the risks of being caught apply equally to the ordered as the disordered. What then is required is an analysis of the costs and benefi ts of a particular course of action as perceived by the perpetrator. It may be that those with mental disorder weigh these costs and benefi ts differently, but perhaps the greatest mediating variable is likely to be the perception of surveillance: delusional disorders involving paranoid features may make people less likely to offend because they perceive themselves to be subject to greater surveillance. In practice, those with mental disorders may be less subject to surveillance because of the environments in which they live, whether due to isolation or because of the arguments about the nature of communities and neighbourhoods explored above. And whilst it may make sense to argue that most violence occurs within close relationships and that these might be more subject to fracture where those with mental disorder are involved, or that those relationships are inherently more proximate and continuous where caregivers are involved, both of these explanatory strands largely draw their power from the nature and intensity of the contact, rather than any irrational motives by the perpetrator.1
