ABSTRACT

At the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama concluded that the evolution of human societies through different forms of government had culminated in modern liberal democracy.2 China seems to have convinced the world that it will be an exception, at least in the foreseeable future. While the Chinese leadership refuses to allow any erosion of the Communist Party of China’s monopoly of political power, it has been very skilful in meeting the emerging challenges in the era of economic reforms and opening to the outside world. Hu Jintao and the other Chinese leaders today are well aware of the sharpening

social contradictions; that is why they are now trying to build a ‘harmonious society’, paying more attention to underprivileged groups, mainly through the establishment of a social security net. Efforts are being made to maintain a better balance against undue emphasis on economic growth alone in the past – this includes according higher priority to environmental protection, more efficient utilisation of natural resources, encouragement of internal consumption, and placing greater dependence on the domestic market. The Chinese leadership is also attempting to maintain a friendly international environment into the future by establishing various kinds of strategic partnerships with major world powers and offering reassurances so as to downplay the perception of a ‘China threat’ among its Asian neighbours.3 It is commonly recognised that these policy orientations are in the right direction. The question is how successful they will be in maintaining political stability in the absence of genuine political reform. The rapid increase in protests, riots, and mass petitions not only reflects

exacerbating social contradictions in the context of the widening gap between the rich and poor, it also demonstrates the empowerment of underprivileged groups through their rising anger against corruption and abuse of power.4 The Tiananmen Incident in June 1989 was triggered by outrage against corruption and demands for democracy. Today’s Chinese leadership still refuses to respond to calls for a reversal of the official verdict on the incident. Similarly, it suppressed

discussions on the 40th anniversary of the launch of the Cultural Revolution, and imposed many restrictions on the funeral of former Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. This pattern of behaviour reveals the government’s strong sense of insecurity. It is generally believed that Beijing has been very concerned with the ‘colour revolutions’ in the post-Soviet states in recent years. A similar situation exists in Hong Kong. Economic development alone is no

longer sufficient to ensure the legitimacy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government, which confronts challenges more severe than those faced by the British colonial administration. But the Chinese leadership believes that economic growth remains the key to the territory’s social and political stability. Beijing’s Hong Kong policy remains within a united front framework, with no intention of introducing genuine democracy. Since the status quo is still satisfactory to the community, which has no intention of challenging the Chinese authorities, moderate economic growth dampens grievances sufficiently to maintain stability. However, the HKSAR government lacks the legitimacy to define priorities even in the economic and social services field. In view of Beijing’s perception of threat from the pro-democracy movement, it is unlikely that it will release a timetable and roadmap for implementation of genuine democracy.