ABSTRACT
THE IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY Robert Michels’s iron law of oligarchy is generally recognised to be one of the most devastating propositions in all of social science, for it under mines a cornerstone of both liberaldemocratic and Marxist theory: the view that democracy is possible in the modern world. By analysing the workings of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), Michels sought to demonstrate that large-scale organisations-even those, like the SPD, which are overtly committed to democratic ideals-must, by their very nature, degenerate into bureaucracies ruled by the few. Michels (1962, pp. 61-80) cites several ‘technical and administrative causes’ of oligar chical leadership in large and expanding political organisations.1 Among the most important of these are, first, the growing number and complex ity of duties, which obviate direct participation in administrative matters by the membership, requiring instead a specialised staff. Secondly, the growing number and complexity of issues sharply curtail members’ participation in general decision-making and augment the sway of knowledgeable leaders. And thirdly, the large number of members prevents regular contact among them, thus enabling the leadership to exercise the principle of divide et impera (Cassinelli, 1953, p. 781). Increasing size of, and division of labour within, political organisations are thus considered by Michels to be the chief factors which prevent the mass membership from effectively participating in the political process.
