ABSTRACT
Romantics are always in search of the ‘true’ self-the higher, purer being, radically disjoined from its lower, impure counterpart. In ordinary conversation, this search for the pure often takes the form of a radical separation between ‘high’ and ‘low’ activities. In philosophical ethics, it more often takes the form of a supposed disjunction between the ‘pure’, moral self and the ‘lower’ self that is concerned with non-moral values. The proponents of this ethical romanticism may side with Nietzsche, dismissing our normal morality as a slave mentality and replacing it by a boundless commitment to the highest non-moral standards of achievement. Or they may side with Augustine, dismissing worldly non-moral values as dross, and insisting that the only task for man is to keep a proper moral relation to his Creator. But these two different kinds of romantics are fundamentally at one in their belief that moral and non-moral values are utterly disjoined from one another. All ethical romantics feel sure that there is no intrinsic connection between ‘being good at’ or ‘doing well at’ some activity in a non-moral sense, and being morally good or doing what is morally right. They point out that a person may be, from a technical point of view, an excellent artist or craftsman or businessman or playwright, and may yet use this excellence to further some morally abominable aim. And they conclude that a person is bound to be torn, throughout his life, between committing himself thoroughly to the pursuit of technical excellence and committing himself thoroughly to the pursuit of moral excellence: one can try either to be a genius or to be a saint, but not both.
