ABSTRACT
The three authors of this chapter have known Jonathan Evans for many years and have published a large number of joint papers with him. It has been and continues to be a pleasure working alongside him and we have all learnt much through this collaboration, not least the importance of objectivity, openmindedness and integrity in research, characteristics that Jonathan shares with some of the very best scientists of his generation. During this time we have agreed on, or come to agreement on, many things and this has resulted in significant progress on a number of issues in the psychology of reasoning. To illustrate, in the case of the first author, this has included the development of a new theory of conditionals (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003a; Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005; Handley, Evans, & Thompson, 2006), the empirical work that led to hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2007; Evans, Over, & Handley, 2003b; Handley & Evans, 2000; Evans, Handley, Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999), the selective-processing model of belief bias (Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001; Morley, Evans, & Handley, 2004), and most recently the integration of a dual-process framework with the suppositional account of conditionals (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2007, 2008). However, as with any productive collaboration, we also disagree on a number of things, and it is one of these areas of disagreement that is the focus of this chapter.
