ABSTRACT
The internecine warfare that followed Sultan Malik-Shah’s death was carried out between his and Nizam al-Mulk’s sons, a situation that appears to have only benefited the commanders. They finally brokered a deal between Sultan Berk-Yaruk and his brother Tapar, as a result of which Seljuqid hegemony became bi-partite once more (1104). After Great Sultan Berk-Yaruk’s death Sultan Tapar did not declare his brother Sancar sultan, but he never interfered in Khurasan. Soon after his death (1118), Sancar declared himself Great Sultan and Tapar’s eldest son sultan (1121). Nizam al-Mulk’s eldest son Muayyad al-Mulk played a key role in BerkYaruk’s struggles with Terken Khatun, Sultan Malik-Shah’s son Tutuş, and finally Tapar and his uterine brother Sancar. At first he and Berk-Yaruk were supported by Nizam al-Mulk’s soldiery, the Nizamiyya. However, these and the royal corps in Isfahan appear to have been quickly decimated in the bloody battles that initially took place. This left the commanders and their soldiery in the regions, supported by incomes from lands allocated to them under Sultan Malik-Shah. These were without exception either mamluks of Turkic origin or Türkmen begs. They appear to have not only avoided taking the field against each other but also refused to leave their iqtacs at harvest time. Having been replaced by his brother Fakhr al-Mulk (1095), with whom he is said to have fallen out over their father’s jewellery, Muayyad al-Mulk encouraged Tapar to challenge Sultan Berk-Yaruk at a time when he had finally achieved a position from which he may have been able to put the affairs of empire into order and threw the Great Seljuq Empire into further disarray (1098). In the process Muayyad al-Mulk went so far as to have the sultan’s mother strangled, causing him finally to lose his life in a similar fashion in the sultan’s hands. While Sultan Berk-Yaruk and Tapar struggled, the Crusaders arrived and took Urfa and Antakya (1096), then Jerusalem (1099). After this they and the Seljuqs avoided open conflict unless the field of battle gave their diametrically opposite military strengths an advantage. In the process the Great Seljuqs lost control of south-eastern Anatolia and Syria to various commanders. The chapter follows Özaydın’s Sultan Muhammed Tapar Devri Selçuklu Tarihi (498-511/1105-1118) (1990) and Sultan Berkyaruk Devri Selçuklu Tarihi (485498/1092-1104) (2001), as well as ‘Büyük Selçuklu Emiri Kürboğa’ (2000). In
the case of the Seljuqs of Syria, the chapter follows Sevim’s Suriye Selçukluları I – Fetihten Tutuş’un Ölümüne Kadar (1965) and Suriye-Filistin Selçuklu Devleti Tarihi (1989). Turan’s Selçuklular Zamanında Türkiye (1993c) has been referred to for Anatolia. As in the previous chapters, references to other works are for supplementary material pertinent to the events being reviewed.
