Conclusion

Köymen remains the main historian on the Great Seljuqs. In Turkey his works are supplemented by Kafesoğlu’s and more recently Merçil’s on the Seljuqs of Kirman, Sevim’s on the Seljuqs of Syria and Palestine, and lastly Özaydın’s on Sultan Berk-Yaruk and Sultan Tapar. Turan concentrated on the Seljuqs of Anatolia and Sümer on the Oguz. After his work on Sultan Malik-Shah, Kafesoğlu sufficed with his book-length article on the Seljuqs. In Turkey the Council for Higher Education’s insistence that all theses presented cover new ground is one reason why no one has followed Köymen or Kafesoğlu. In the West there is no such bureaucratic excuse. Their failure stems from their view that everything nomadic is essentially primitive and Iranian culture or Islam is the civilizing element in all things Turkish. Despite taking care to point out the Turkic character of the Great Seljuq Empire, ironically Turkish scholarship on the Seljuqs shares this view, largely because of Köprülü. In Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri (The Influence of Byzantine Institutions on Ottoman Institutions) Köprülü argued that Ottoman institutions had been derived from the Seljuqs and hence the Abbasids, but then added that the Abbasids may have been influenced by the Byzantines and the Iranians. Köymen, Turan and Sümer were his students. Even Kafesoğlu, who argued that the Seljuqs succeeded in ‘welding’ Turkic characteristics to Islamic ones, could only come up with ‘old Turkish traditions, customs, and usages’ besides noting that the Seljuqs and their military communicated in Turkish. According to Kafesoğlu, the other characteristics were the sultan’s tuğra or monogram on official documents; the bow and arrow, used as symbols of sovereignty; the institution of guardianship (atabeg); the role of women in state affairs; Turan or steppe tactics in battle; yoğ or leviratus; strangling of dynastic members with their own bowstring, not to shed their blood; toy or public banquets; tuğ or horsetail banner; large hunting drives that served as manoeuvres; the ball and stick game; folk dancing; and customary laws, though he did not specify how and where these were applied instead of Shari law. Akçura’s precepts are only partially applicable to the Seljuqs, but Köprülü’s framework fails altogether. The Seljuqs did not ally with indigenous aristocracies and turn their backs on the Türkmen as he proposed. Their Türkmen affiliates could not have considered the Seljuqs first among equals. The Seljuqs were

Akbudun, nobility. The Türkmen were Karabudun, common folk, little better than slaves. There was no need for the Seljuqs to ally with indigenous aristocracies to become free of the Türkmen. Quite the opposite, Sultan Malik-Shah clearly set out to eradicate local dynasties, replacing them with not only so-called mamluk commanders of Turkic origin but also Türkmen begs, breakaway Turkic noblemen and their affiliates who arrived after the Seljuqs became established. Ultimately it was the Turkic character of the Seljuqs’ statecraft that prevented the sons of indigenous notables such as Nizam al-Mulk from transforming the Great Seljuq Empire into an Irano-Islamic state. Turkic nobility organized their affiliates in thousands, hundreds and tens. The larger groups were commanded by family members and the lesser ones by affiliated nobles. At each level there were households of chamberlains and élite corps. Noblemen led by example and earned their élite corps’ fealty. Those of lesser martial ability held other jobs. They became household administrators and in the case of an empire government officials. Consequently, even a breakaway noble house was ready to rule a realm. The Great Seljuqs most certainly had the will and the aptitude, adapting to an agrarian environment with urban centres. There can be no doubt they would have become Shicites rather than Sunnis if the former had prevailed in Transoxania. They showed the same practicality by not imposing their households on their Iranian and Arabic subjects. Instead they appointed government officials from local noble houses. Regardless of their contributions however, these did not share sovereignty in the Great Seljuq Empire. The Seljuqs only appointed male or female family members, or Turkic commanders from their élite corps.