ABSTRACT
Discussions of emergence in physics1 usually adopt one of two general approaches. Starting from intuitive desiderata a concept of emergence should satisfy, one can (i) develop a philosophical account of emergence that incorporates and makes precise the initial intuitions and then try to fi nd illustrations for this model in scientifi c practice; alternatively, one can (ii) study cases in science where the intuitive desiderata seem to be satisfi ed and then develop a philosophical model of emergence that subsumes those cases. Given these different approaches, disagreements over which phenomena count as emergent are likely, even if everybody were to agree on the pre-theoretical desiderata. Differing views about the latter, of course, compound the confl icts. Whether emergent phenomena, for instance, supervene on ‘base level’ phenomena or whether the ‘completeness’ of physics at the base level should be satisfi ed are questions which different philosophical views will answer in different ways.
