ABSTRACT
Clifford’s claim was based firmly on a moral argument. To hold a belief merely, as he says, ‘for the solace and private pleasure of the believer’3 without adequate evidence, proof, or even perhaps enquiry was for Clifford simply immoral. Even in such cases as those of religious belief where evidence, proof or enquiry may have no place the suggestion was that we ought to suspend belief rather than choose a view which appeals to, or comforts, us. Clifford took a very high moral line in the matter, claiming, for example, that even where such a belief did no direct or perceptible harm the immorality of holding it remained. For we may thereby be encouraged to hold other beliefs on such an inadequate basis, and this will lead to disadvantageous consequences in the long run both for the licentious believer and for humanity in general. According to Clifford such a procedure is
James had no wish to dispute every aspect of Clifford’s thesis. Though he rightly complains of Clifford’s strident yet querulous tone,5 he nevertheless also referred to some aspects of his view as ‘healthy’ and would have echoed it for most cases of belief. James would not have wished to query the thesis that wherever possible we should proportion our beliefs to the available evidence. But he also thought that there were legitimate exceptions to Clifford’s universal condemnation to be found among moral and religious belief. Even in that context James did not think that all beliefs of these kinds were legitimate exceptions. His concern was principally to identify as clearly as possible the conditions under which such exceptions could be validated. But he also thought that Clifford’s view rested on a general misconception about the nature of belief. In particular it rested on a failure to appreciate the overlap which James had stressed in the Principles between belief, volition, and attention.
