ABSTRACT
In his lectures on Pragmatism James summarises his views in the following way: ‘Such then would be the scope of pragmatism-first, a method; and second a genetic theory of what is meant by truth.’1 The two aspects are connected in at least this way. The method is a means of settling disputes, and one philosophical dispute arises over the nature of truth. Later, in his Preface to The Meaning of Truth, he outlines the three central tenets of ‘radical empiricism’, of which at least the first has some relevance to James’s pragmatic method. For the first item is the postulate ‘that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience’. James later refers back to the idea of things of an ‘inexperiencable nature’ and says of them that while they may exist they form no part of the material for philosophical debate.2 It is plain that his empiricism has strong links with his pragmatic method, though he himself regarded the two things as logically independent of each other. He says, for example,
He nevertheless allows that the pragmatist account of truth does offer support for radical empiricism when he says: ‘Were this pragmatic contention admitted, one great point in the victory of radical empiricism would also be scored.’4
