ABSTRACT
James’s theory of truth, one of the twin pillars of his pragmatism, itself has two central aspects. First there is the strict account of truth itself, and second the wider links which the strict account has with other notions such as belief, meaning, and behaviour. It is somewhat artificial to draw such a distinction, but under the first heading I shall outline the main features of James’s account and his attempts to defend that account against criticism. Under the second heading I shall consider more closely the connections between the account of truth and the notions of belief, behaviour and meaning. Two of these issues remain from the previous chapter. On one side it remains to be seen whether any further light may be thrown on James’s view of meaning as a result of the examination of his theory of truth. On the other side it might be asked which of the twin supports for pragmatism has priority. It may be suggested that the two supports, the method and the theory of truth, have parity of status; but if it turned out that the method rested on a theory of meaning and that theory itself rested on the account of truth, then there would be reason to revise such a view.
