ABSTRACT
As outlined in the previous chapter, the chief aim of the RTFR was to reduce fiscal exactions and thereby increase peasant income. It went further than previous attempts at burden reduction because it aimed not only at cutting taxes, but also sought to rid the political framework of the incentives for irregular fee-taking. What were these incentives? As Chapter 4 will show in detail, policy makers diagnosed a lack of accountability and transparency at the local level and found that central control over local governments was slipping. This, the narrative concluded, made it easy for greedy local cadres to take money from the peasants. Of course, most of this money was not pocketed for private gain, but was used to meet the ever-increasing expenditures of local governments. They were accused of having exhausted all other sources of revenue. Practically all county-and township-level governments were in the red, and many townships had accumulated liabilities so massive that they were practically bankrupt. Allegedly, unnecessary wage expenditures took by far the largest share in local government expenditures. As a consequence, policy makers at the centre advocated imposing checks on local governments and reducing their autonomy. The following sections examine the substance of these accusations. Was the increase of the local workforce, of wage expenditures and of local liabilities, really so massive? If so, is there a connection between excessive hiring and liabilities? And finally, is there really a relationship between these phenomena and increasing the peasant burden?
