ABSTRACT
Since the 2007 election of President Nicolas Sarkozy, several reform processes regarding French security policy are underway.1 The 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security (Livre blanc 2008) develops a national security strategy that gives more priority to national security issues than to military ones; indeed, intelligence is given pride of place at the expense of nuclear deterrence, the former cornerstone of French security policy. Sarkozy announced several changes: first, he committed himself to bringing France and NATO closer together with the objective of French full participation in the alliance; second, he envisioned drawing the era of the domaine resérvé to a close, wherein the sphere of foreign and defence policy is under the exclusive control of the Chief of State; third, he agreed to endow the Parliament with new powers for the use of force – even though this had lain at the heart of the executive prerogative – through the July 2008 Constitutional amendments. These elements of ‘rupture’, as proclaimed in Sarkozy’s motto, seem to illustrate a normalization process of French security culture and governance in terms of two dynamics: a transition to a post-Westphalian approach, and also a trend towards a departure from ‘French exceptionalism’ (Erlanger and Bennhold 2008). Nevertheless, France’s pattern of international projection has not abated. Instead, France’s ‘return to Europe’ and the objectives of French international missions to promote and defend human rights were re-asserted in the first announcements of the newly elected President on 6 May 2007.
